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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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PANY and vV AYNE D. CRIDDLE, 
Utah State Engineer, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
10325 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Thi:,.; is an action to determine whether or not Glen-
dale Irrigation Company is entitled to a priority higher 
titan all the other proprietors on the East Fork of the 
Yirgin River (Long Valley Creek) entitling it to all 
thP waters of that source until its rights are filled. 
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DISPOSFrION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On Motion for Summary Judgment by both Plain-
tiffs and Defendants the District Court of Kane County 
granted the motion of Plaintiffs opposing and denied 
the motion of Defendants asserting the priority just de-
scribed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs and Respondents seek affirmance of the 
trial court's ruling. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because of significant omissions the Respondents do 
not agree with the Statement of Facts of Appellants. 
The Plaintiffs and Respondents will be referred to 
as the Plaintiffs and the Defendants and Appellants as 
the Defendants. 
Exhibited \vith this brief is an appendix which con-
tains first an illustrative map of the entire Virgin River 
System and thereafter abstracts from the "McCarty," 
"Burton" and "Cox'' Decree proceedings which are the 
prior judicial determinations affecting the rights of these 
parties. As a footnote on each document there is indi-
cated its source among the five files of the Burton-Cox 
Litigation which were made a part of the record here 
as Exhibits 2 through 6. So that continued resort to 
those cumbersome files will not be required, we will 
ref er to those excerpts by appendix page. The original 
document may be found by ref erring to the appendix 
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page footnote disclosing the file and page ·where it is 
entered. 
'l'he Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was 
bas<'d upon the entire record in the prior general adjudic-
tions and the files in this action including specifically the 
Original and Supplemental Interrogatories and the an-
~\\ (•rs thereto (Tr. 45-60) and the depositions taken of 
all holders of the office of President of Glendale Irriga-
tion Company' for the period between 1918 and the 
[ll'Psent (Depositions appear at Tr. 78-138). 2 
The Defendants did not oppose any of these show-
ings with affidavits or other countering representations 
as permitted by Rule 56 ( c). 
GEOGRAPHY 
Long Valley Creek is an upper, isolated and the 
1•asternmost section of the Virgin River (Appendix i) 
commonly referred to as the latter's "East Fork." It 
arises in northern Kane County and flows through the 
rnlley in which are situated the towns of Glendale, 
Orderville, and Mt. Carmel and on the floor of which 
ar(• farms irrigated by ranchers and agricultural proprie-
tors who, as holders of individually decreed rights or 
as combined into one or more of the corporate water 
distrihution systems holding decreed interests in the 
East Fork, comprise the parties to this action. 
'Tr. 87, 97, and 128 establish identities and tenure of the company's 
Presidents during that period. 
2Except for that of Joseph Smith, President for one year (in 1944), 
now deceased. 
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At the south end of Long Vall0y the creek contours 
southwesterly where it flmvs through deep-gulched coun-
try in the course of which its waters are not capal1le 
of being used for some 20 miles and until it reaches the 
''Dixie Country'' in -Washington County. It is only in 
winter months that any water reaches -·Washington 
County. (Appendix Page vi). 
PRIOR ADJUDICATIONS 
In 1900 a decree determining rights to the use of 
East Fork waters was entered and known thereafter 
as the ''McCarty Decree" (Admitted by the pleadings, 
Tr. 36-39, and set out in full at Appendix Pages iv and v). 
Contrary to the conclusion drawn by Appellants (Appel-
lants' Brief Page 3), this Decree was continually re-
garded by the parties, including Defendant Glendale 
Irrigation Company, as conclusive of the respective 
priorities of all users on the stream. All parties acknmY-
ledged their priorities to be upon a par or equal. (Appen-
dix Pages ii and iii). 
In 1919 the case of St. George & Washington Canal 
Conipany vs. Hurricane Canal Company, Case No. 270, 
in the Fifth Judicial Court of Utah, County of Washing-
ton, was instituted later to become a general adjudication, 
one of the first after enactment of the authorizing statute 
(Chapter 67, Laws of 1919, now 73-±-1, et. seq., FCA, 
1953), and ultimately to embrace the entire Virgin River 
including the East Fork (Exhibit 2). 
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Presiding over this Court •ms Judge Thomas H. 
Bnrton and the adjudication he made is commonly known 
a:; the "Burton Decree." 
When this action ('scalated into a general adjudica-
tion, watn mwrs' claims werP filed by all of the East Fork 
n:;ers. \Ve agree with counsel that Orderville Irrigation 
Company claimed a priority of 1871 and l\It. Carmel Irri-
gation Company a priority date of 1870 but that Glen-
dalP stood npon the year 1865' 
'Although we contend the history of colonization in Long Valley 
will not be material because of the McCarty Decree, a claim has 
been made that the Town of Glendale was settled first. The 
historical facts are that no colonization was made in Glendale 
prior to the remainder of "Long Valley" but only an entry at-
tempted by the Berry Brothers in 1865, some of the family of whom 
were killed by Indians, causing the entire expedition to withdraw. 
Neither they nor any one else returned to Glendale until the entire 
Valley was settled during the period of 1871 to 1874 from which 
time they maintained continuous colonization. In the monograph 
series publication of Utah State University Press, January 1964, 
Forms and Methods of Early Mormon Settlement in Utah and the 
Surrounding Region, 1847 to 1877, by Joel Edward Ricks, Emeritus 
Professor of History, we find the following statement at page 107: 
The advice of Brigham Young was followed, a meeting was 
held and a resolution to abandon Muddy settlement was passed 
by a vote of 61 to 2. A committee was sent to investigate the 
possibilities of Long Valley in South Central Utah. The his-
torian of the United Order of Orderville described their find-
ings as follows: 
'The explorers entered the Valley on Christmas Day 1870 
and found it to be simply a canyon from 100 yards to % 
of a mile in width and about 15 miles in length from the 
lower part and going up the river to the upper tributary 
or forks of the river (Virgin). The valley contains about 
1300 acres of tillable land and scarcely enough water in the 
river to irrigate it. From the lower part of the valley to 
what is known as the rim of the basin, is about Twenty 
Five miles. The small valley has several canyons branching 
out reaching the rim. Within six miles of the top of the 
rim and on the top are covered with long leaved pine 
timber, from which a good quality of lumber can be made. 
The soil of the valley is generally heavy clay, the climate 
is mild and adapted to the raising of fruits and small grain.' 
The report of the explorers was favorably received by the 
people in the towns on the banks of the Muddy so they left 
their houses and farms and migrated in a body 200 strong 
entering Long Valley in March 1874 and in the southern end 
they founded Mt. Carmel. 
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The East Fork users were apprehensive that tlw 
Washington County Plaintiffs might assert very early 
priority dates and place a call upon the waters from 
upper sources and being fearful that their rights may 
thus be taken away, the principal Long Valley users 
joined to send representatives to St. George to "fight 
for and uphold the 'McCarty Decree' " (Tr. 83, 115-117). : 
This same fear undoubtedly prompted Glendale and 
others to exaggerate their priority dates in completing 
water users' claims. It is inconceivable that one hundred 
per cent of the uses under Glendale's diversions could 
all have been perfected before any of the other corporate 
or individual users made any diversions. 
Threats posed by the general adjudication to the 
East Fork rights were removed by a stipulation of the 
Washington County users disclaiming interest in the 
East Fork irrigation practices (Appendix Page vi). Also 
removed as a result of that concession was the necessity 
of proving accuracy of the priority dates claimed which, 
as indicated in the prior footnote, could never have been 
established. 
Pursuant to the general adjudication statute the 
State Engineer filed his proposed determination on Sep-
tember 10, 1924 (Exhibit 5, Page 14) suggesting that 
the Court establish disparate priorities as between the 
users on the East Fork. 
On December 15, 1924 and within the 90 days allowed 
for doing so, Glendale Irrigation Company, Orderville 
Irrigation Company, Mt. Carmel Irrigation Company, 
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and the individual ranchers joined in an objection to 
the proposed determination unequivocally rejecting the 
attempt by the State Engineer to fix different dates of 
priority or to rank those rights established by the Mc-
Carty Decree with uneven priorities. To this objection 
the parties attached a copy of the "McCarty Decree.'' 
The deposition of Marcellus Johnson establishes execu-
tion of the document by Glendale Irrigation Company 
(Tr. 8+, 85, 138). This Objection is set out in full on 
Pages ii and iii of the Appendix and the original with 
its exhibits and executed counterparts can be found m 
Exhibit 5, the Burton Decree file marked "1924," at 
pages 133 to 137, inclusive. 
The prayer of this pleading (styled "Objection") 
was granted by implication by an Order of the Court 
dated October 9, 1925 (Appendix Page vii), was assum-
ed by the State Engineer to have been previously granted 
as appears from his petition dated October 21, 1926 (Ap-
pendix Page viii) and is included within the class of stip-
ulations or other resolutions of objections, all of which 
are approved for incorporation and carrying into the 
final determination, by an order dated October 27, 1926, 
signed by Judge Burton (Appendix Page ix). In each 
of those three documents the general adjudication pro-
ceedings moved forward upon the recited premise that: 
* * * All parties objecting to the State Engineer's 
Proposed Determination having either appeared 
personally in court or by stipulation filed herein, 
and all parties consented that the Court render 
its decree in accordance with the proposed deter-
mination of the State Engineer filed herein as 
amended and corrected by said stipulations, with 
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the c'xception of that of [an objection not affPct-
ing this issue]. 
The ''Burton Decree" entered m 1925 carried the 
recital that: 
* ~, * within said time several of the parties filed 
objections to specific parts of said Propos<c'd De-
termination * * * and on the 12th day of December, 
1925 the said parties by their attorneys or in per-
son had entered into written stipulations, or oral 
stipulations, made in open court, from time to 
time, and agreeing to all their rights of, in, or 
to said water, and the use of the waters of the 
Virgin River System, with the exception of the 
Virgin Canal Company * * * which objections 
were presented to the Court * * * and the Court 
rendered judgment on said protest, and it appear-
ing that the Proposed Determination made by 
the State Engineer had been corrected to conform 
\vith the judgment above mentioned. 
* * * * 
The Schedule of Rights, determining the priority, 
quantity, purposes, etc., under which said water 
is hereby decreed to the parties named herein 
is the amended Proposed Determin,ation of the 
State Engineer, as designated in Sec. I hereof and 
made a part of this decree, which is as follows: 
[The schedule of water rights enumerates 
and specifies the rights of the parties] 
(Emphasis added) 
We have religiously searched all the exhibits reflect-
ing the Burton-Cox Decree proceedings, and cannot find 
that a "Burton" Decree was ever filed. Apparently 
the State Engineer prepared one and obtained certifi-
cates of true copies thereof, (Tr. 169); however, the 
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files do not disclose that a "Burton" Decree was ever 
entered. 
'rlie "certified copy" of the Burton Decree which 
is on file in the Office of, and will be supplied to the 
Court by, the State Engineer, shows that the same vol-
nmes of water were awarded to the parties as had been 
f(iven them under the McCarty Decree (Appendixpagex). 
rSES ON THE STREAM DURING AND 
AFTER THE GENERAL ADJUDICATION 
'l'hat the parties believed their "Objection" had been 
am•pted and the relief prayed for granted is an incon-
trovertihle inference from the manner in which they 
conducted themselves during and following the Burton-
Cox Litigation. This contemporaneous construction by 
the parties is elucidated by the discovery proceedings 
upon which the Motion for Plaintiffs' Summary Judg-
ment '''as based. 
At the conclusion of a hearing in this action on the 
first concurrent :Motions for respective Summary J udg-
ments sought by both sides, the Court reserved judgment 
<lnd desired evidence of uses on the stream from the 
time the Burton and Cox Decrees were entered and until 
the time the instant action was commenced. 
Interrogatories were asked of the Defendants sep-
arately and, upon receiving responses to the first, Sup-
plemental Interrogatories were submitted. (Tr. 45-60). 
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Glendale Irrigation Company conceded that only 
in the years 1956 and 1961 did it ever claim, and only 
in the year 1961 did it attempt to exercise, its right 
to an 1865 priority date. Negative reference to asser-
tions of that preference were made by answers to the 
effect that Glendale Irrigation Company had never 
"waived" or "agreed to waive" its priority (Tr. 50). 
However, when asked specifically: 
(Tr. 55 and 56) Calling your attention to Inter-
rogatory No. 5 of the previous interrogatories 
and the answer thereto submitted on October 21, 
1963, said answer states in part: 
'* * * it is the contention of this De-
fendant that so far as known to it, Defendant 
has been given its proper amount of water 
under its proper priority.' 
With respect to the phrase, ''so far as known to 
it," please recite the extent of any such know-
ledge, the years in which it is claimed by tlw 
Defendant Glendale Irrigation Company that it 
has been given the proper amount of water under 
the claimed 1865 priority. * * * If [this informa-
tion] is not personal knowledge of one of its wit-
nesses, but is only upon information and belief, 
please state specifically the facts upon which that 
1nformation and belief is based. 
The Defendant Glendale Irrigation Company answered: 
"(Tr.58) This interrogatory is not subject to 
any precise answer, and particularly at this time." 
'The Defendant stated that it has no record of prior 
distributions or uses (Tr. 51). 
The Defendant replied to interrogatories reaching 
that question that its witnesses would be Walter W. 
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Cannon, \Villard Mackelprang, Charles Anderson, Rex 
Bauer, and "any witnesses in court brought there by 
the State Engineer's Office." (Tr. 57). The State En-
g·ineer answered that it had no witnesses pertaining to 
uses on the stream except for the year 1963 and after 
this action was commenced (Tr. 59). Walter W. Cannon 
was a Deputy State Engineer residing at St. George at 
the time of the Burton Decree (Tr. 117) and not affiliated 
with the Defendant Glendale Irrigation Company. There-
fore, the deposition of the other three witnesses of De-
fendants together with that of Marcellus Johnson, long-
time President of Glendale Irrigation Company and its 
President and stipulator in the Burton Decree proceed-
ings, were taken and appear at Pages 78 through 138 of 
the transcript. 
Marcellus .T ohnson was 83 years old at the time of 
his deposition (Tr. 80). He had irrigated from the East 
F'ork since shortly after 1900 and was on the Glendale 
Irrigation Company's Board of Directors from 1917 until 
19GO except for "three or four years." He was President 
for 30 of those years and specifically during the Burton 
guneral adjudication (Tr. 80-82, 84). 
l\Ir. Johnson's deposition establishes that the in-
tention of Glendale Irrigation in the Burton Litigation 
\lai:l only to protect its interests under the McCarty De-
cree, to retain the same priorities and not to acquire 
any new or higher right; that Glendale Irrigation neither 
attempted nor instructed its representatives or attorneys 
to attempt attaining a higher priority than that of the 
other users and never received any water based upon 
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any preferential priority. His testimony beginning at 
Page 83 of the transcript is as follows: 
(Line 21) 
Q. * ~, * Now at the time you sent your repre-
sentative down to the Court which was su-
pervising this new Decree, did you give your 
representative any instructions about the pri-
orities that you wanted in the Decree? 
A. No. 
(Tr. P. 86, Line 8) 
Q. At any time since the Burton Decree was en-
tered has Glendale Irrigation Company to 
your knowledge been given a priority on all 
the water of the East F'ork so as to fill their 
rights to 100% before anyone else got any 
water? 
A. Not according to my knowledge. 
Q. Now during this same period of time, Mr. 
Johnson, if there was insufficient water in 
the East .B'ork to come up to the primary 
rights, would you pro rate losses? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All the users would pro rate losses; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now during these periods about which you 
were speaking, were there ever years when 
there was not enough water in the East Fork 
to fill all of the rights? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How often would that occur? 
A. Well, that was quite a common thing in July, 
before the rains come. I would say after the 
run-off in the spring why it would drop down. 
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I can't say just what month. I wouldn't try 
to say because sometimes it held up better 
than it would at other times. 
Q. You say it was a common thing though? 
A. It ·was a common thing. I don't think we 
ever had 100% all summer as long as I was 
in the Glendale Irrigation Company. I don't 
remember it. 
Q. ·while you were President of Glendale Irri-
gation Company -vvas there ever any demand 
made on the State Engineer or his deputy, 
the River Commissioner, or anyone else, to 
give Glendale one hundred per cent of its 
right before any of the other rights were 
filled~ 
A. During the time I had it and was President? 
Q. During the time you have been acquainted 
with distribution of water on the East Fork 
has that ever happened, when you were Presi-
dent or at other times? 
A. In the last two or three years has there been 
any~ 
Q. Prior to that time? 
A. No, not prior to that time. 
Q. Not prior to that time to your knowledge? 
A. No. 
At Page 8S of the Transcript, under cross-examina-
tion by Mr. Cline, J\,J r. Johnson testified: 
Q. \Vell, what I want to know is when was the 
first time, if yon can recall, that there was 
any mwstion ever raised by the Glendale peo-
pl~ c'oncerning a prior right to that of the 
Orderville people 1 
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A. That would have been 19GO when we were 
at that meeting in James Esplin home when 
you reported having visited the State Engi-
neer, Mr. Bauer. 
MR. BAUER: I think that was at your home. 
I think it was at your home when he asked 
permission to go to the State Engineer's of-
fice to find out what our rights were. I think 
it was in your home, but I could be wrong, 
Mr. Johnson. That is when the first question 
came up. 
Q. Now, Mr. Johnson, you filed these objections 
that you referred to a moment or two ago 
along with the other people~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now included in those objections are the fact 
that you were objecting to the various dates 
of priorities rather than following the Mc-
Carty Decree~ That's correct, isn't it 1 
Wasn't that one of your grounds for objec-
tions, that the Burton Decree, the proposed 
determination set these various users up on 
various dates of priorities rather than fol-
lowing the McCarty Decree~ You recall 
whether that was one of the grounds of your 
objections~ 
A. I wouldn't say that, no. 
Q. You don't know whether that was one of the 
grounds for objections~ 
A. No I don't. To be honest, I had full faith 
in the McCarty Decree when Mr. Anderson 
went down to that hearing in Dixie, that he 
was asking for the McCarty Decree, and that 
they gave us our rights and because of the 
checking up that was taking place, the qurs-
tion of rights and all of that caused, I guess, 
some question in our minds and when .Mr. 
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Anderson came back he said - he reported 
to the Board, as near as I can remember, 
that the McCarty Decree would not be mo-
lested, that they were not concerned with the 
water up the Greek, all they were concerned 
with in that hearing was the water in the 
Dixie Area. 
'l'he deposition of Rex Bauer, another former Presi-
dent of Glendale Irrigation Company, established that 
the testimony of .Mr. Johnson was accurate regarding 
non-exercise of the priority asserted in this litigation 
(Tr. 97) although he did say one president knew of its 
inclusion in the decree in 1944 (Tr. 98; cf. 128). The 
right \Vas never "enjoyed" until the "last two or three 
years." (Tr. 97) 
He further established the assertion of the right 
claimed in Defendant's Answers to Interrogatories to 
have taken place in 1956 was actually 1958, 1959, or 1960 
and was not by the company but was by him personally. 
!Tr. 99) He said that he did not ask the State Engineer 
to ''change anything" (Tr. 101) except the manner of 
administration in checking the diversions, and that the 
existence of a decreed priority came as a "surprise to a 
lot" (T1·. 102, line 13-15). 
His testimony regarding usage found on Page 103 
of the Transcript is as follows: 
Q. 
A. 
Let me ask you this : You surely know the 
answer to this, are there any times when 
Glendale was getting all the water and some-
one else was getting none? 
No, sir, I don't know of a time that that was 
the case. 
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Q. \Vere there any times when Glendale was get-
ting one hundred per cent of its water and 
anyone else was getting less than one hundred 
per cent? 
A. Like I said, I have never been a water com-
missioner or water master, so I don't know. 
Q. As far as you know, the first time this Com-
plaint ever arose was when the State Engi-
neer sent his deputy down and imposed these 
priorities so as to give Glendale one hundred 
per cent of its rights before anyone received 
anything that they were decreed? 
A. Well, I presume that that was the first time 
it was done. But that isn't the first time it 
was brought up. Like I said, Brother Smith 
always insisted that that was the case. 
Q. But you said that Glendale never did enjoy 
the right that he claimed Glendale had? 
A. No, I didn't know of it ever enjoying it. 
At Page 109 of the Transcript .Mr. Bauer concedes 
that 1961 was the first year in ·which Glendale Irriga-
tion Company benefited by any higher priority than the 
other users. 
The deposition of Charles Anderson, formerly a 
president of Glendale Irrigation Company and one of 
the representatives of Glendale Irrigation Company and 
the other users at the time of the Burton general adjudi-
cation, testified as follows (Tr. 118): 
Q. Now after the Burton Decree was entered 
' did Glendale's rights change in any way 1 
No only that in the Burton Decree the pri-
' 't ority dates were mentioned and they weren 
A. 
in the McCarty Decree. 
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Q. All right. As a result of that did Glendale 
start getting more \Yater? 
A. No, they didn't, the company kind of \Vent 
on a share and share alike basis, as Brother 
Johnson, Marcellus, told you, for a while. 
Q. How long did that last? 
A. Oh, it lasted up until the time the Glendale 
Irrigation ·Company asked the State Engi-
neer to grant them whatever rights they had. 
Q. And that would have been in 1960 or 1961, is 
that right? 
A. Whenever that was. 
Q. Now during this period of time between 192.J. 
and 1960 or 1961, were there years when there 
wasn't enough water in East Fork of the Vir-
gin River to satisfy all the rights? 
A. Well, I imagine there was. I can't remember 
the years when there wasn't some years it 
was drier than it was other years. 
Q. About what months in those years would this 
condition exist? 
A. Oh, I think along the middle of summer be-
fore the summer rains got started, is usually 
the low time. 
Q. Would it happen in almost every year? 
A. vVell, in some years it didn't. When you have 
a heavy snow fall and the water was high, 
why some years you had all the water you 
wanted, but -
Q. vV ould those years be the exception or would 
they be the rule? 
A. Oh, I think it was an exception. 
Q. The exceptional years would be the ones when 
the primary was full? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. All right, now during that period of time 
would you say that all companies continued 
on this share and share alike basis up until 
1960 or 1961? 
A. Yes, I think they tried to do that. 
The only other witness Defendants proposed to call 
was Willard Mackelprang who testified in his deposi-
tion (Tr. 127, 128) that although some of the Glendale 
Irrigation Company users in the mid-fifties claimed they 
should be getting more water under a higher priority 
nothing was done about it and the uses on the stream 
did not change. He made an unofficial visit to the State 
Engineer's Office in 1956, but no action was taken to 
change the administration of the stream (Tr. 130). No 
actual change in distribution based on Glendale's priority 
took place until 1961. (Tr. 135) 
This suit was commenced immediately after that 
action was ordered by the State Engineer (Tr. 1). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING DE-
FENDANTS' MOTION FOR A SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT AND IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR A SUMMARY .JUDGMENT UPON THE ISSUE 
OF PRIORITIES SOLELY. 
A. The Burton and Cox Decrees must be interpre-
ted to continue equal priority dates as between 
parties to the McCarty Decree. 
B. The historical and present uses on the stream, 
the contemporaneous construction of the Bur-
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ton and Cox Decrees by the parties, and the 
stipulation resolving the issue of priorities 
collectively or in the disjunctive preclude De-
fendants from changing the uses, practices 
or administration of the East Fork. 
C. To the extent that either the Burton or the 
Cox Decree, or both, purports to subordinate 
Plaintiffs' priorities to those of the Defendant 
Glendale Irrigation Company, the adjudication 
is void. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN REFUSING 
TO DISQUALIFY IDMSELF. 
A. The Affidavit of Defendants was insufficient 
as a matter of law. 
B. The Affidavit of Defendants was not timely. 
C. Defendants cannot be prejudiced because of 
the availability of complete direct review of 
both the facts and the law. 
POINT III. 
THE INTERROGATORIES AND THEIR ANSWERS, 
THE DEPOSITIONS, AND THE ENTIRE FILE AND 
PLEADINGS ARE SUFFICIENT UPON WHICH TO 
BASE THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DIRECTED THE 
STATE~ ENGINEER TO DISREGARD PRIORITY 
DA'I'I~S PURPORTEDLY ADOPTED BY THE BUR-
TON-COX DECREES IN DEROGATION OF THE 
EQUAL PRIORITY DATES ESTABLISHED BY 
'l'HE MC CARTY DECREE. 
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ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING DE-
FENDANTS' MOTION FOR A SUMMARY .JUDG-
MENT AND IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTIO~ 
FOR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT UPON THE ISSUE 
OF PRIORITIES SOLELY. 
A. The Burton and Cox Decrees must be interpre-
ted to continue equal priority dates as between 
parties to the McCarty Decree. 
Actions determining water rights are intrinsically 
equitable. Jens en vs. Birch Creek Ranch Co., 76 Utah 
356, 289 P. 1097. 
It has been frequently stated that equity regards as 
done that which ought to be done. This has been said 
to be equity's favorite maxim. It is closely connected 
with the maxim that e<1uity regards intent and suh-
stance rather than form, and the foundation of all dis-
tinctively equitable property rights, estates, and inter-
ests. 30 C.J.S. Page 507. Equity, Sec. 106; Page 513, 
Sec. 107. 
In applying the rule that equity regards intent and 
substance rather than form, the case of Trapp v. Gordon, 
7 N.E.2d 869, 366 Ill. 102, declares that subsequent acts 
and conduct of the parties with reference to a written 
instrument will be considered in determining the in-
tention of the parties which intention is the real sourte 
in determining the proper meaning of the transaction. 
On the question of interpretation of stipulated or 
consent judgments, in 49 C.J.S. at Page 314, Sec. 178, 
it is declared : 
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[A consent judgment's operation and effect] 
must be gathered from the terms used in the 
agreement, and it should not be extended beyond 
the clear import of such terms * * * 
The indisputable record demonstrates facts pre-
cisely fitting all these maxims: 
The stipulation of the parties (Appendix ii, iii) 
spPaks for itself. All the interested parties desired equiv-
alPnt priorities. What ought to have been done was the 
immediate modification of the State Engineer's Proposed 
Determination to establish 1870 priorities uniformly 
among the stipulators. 
The parties thereafter and continuously to the year 
this action was commenced, conducted themselves as 
though what ought to have been done actually had been 
dorn'. 
Upon these two propositions there is no evidence 
more succinct than the testimony of the witness most 
adverse (Tr. 51) to Plaintiffs' position, Charles Ander-
son, where he stated that he was the representative for 
Glendale Irrigation Company at the general adjudication 
]ll'oceedings at St. George in 1924 (Tr. 114); that there 
\\ ne no court appearances other than for the purpose 
of npholding the McCarty Decree (Tr. 115); no adverse 
proceedings between the East Fork users (Tr. 116); and 
that there ~were at that time and since have been no 
('hanges in distribution practices on the East Fork (Tr. 
118, 119). 
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Sections 3± and 30, p. 117 of the Lmvs of 1919, en-
acting the general adjudication statute, and in force at 
the time of the Burton-Cox proceedings provided in part: 
If any contest or objection on the part of any 
claimant shall have been filed, as in this chapter 
provided, the court shall give not less than fifteen 
days' notice to all claimants, stating when and 
where the matter will be heard. 
* * * * 
The statements filed by the claimants shall stand 
in the place of pleadings, and issues may be made 
thereon * * * the filed statements of claimants 
shall be competent evidence of the facts stated 
therein wnless the same are put in issite. 
(Emphasis added) 
The water users' claims to the extent they purported 
to rank priorities were not only put in issue by the 
parties, they were expressly repudiated (Appendix ii and 
iii) and the matter thereby conclusively resolved. 
The record discloses no notice whatsover to the 
claimants of a hearing upon any issues drmvn for the 
plain reason that there were no longer any issues. 
We are here dealing with a stipulated or "consent" 
decree. That these parties' appearance and consent, 
along with the others, formed the basis for the court's 
jurisdiction to proceed is made clear by the documents 
appearing at Appendix pages vii, viii, and ix. 
'Concerning consent judgments, Volume 49 C.J.S. P· 
312, Judgments Sec. 176, has this to say: 
-While an order for entry of a consent judgment 
is a judicial act in the sense that it requires the 
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court to examine the record to determine its au-
thority, the court also acts ministerially in the 
sense that its power to enter judgment depends 
on the agreement or consent of the parties. So, 
where the parties have lawfully agreed, the actual 
entry of judgment is a mere ministerial act. 
While we agree with counsel that a judicial error 
must be revised on appeal, nevertheless, a clerical error 
may be cured any time; whether before or after time for 
appeal has elapsed. One test used to determine whether 
an error in a judgment is a judicial one or a clerical one 
is whether the mistake relates to something the court 
did not consider and pass on, or considered and erron-
eously decided, or whether there was a failure to pre-
serve or correctly represent in the record, in all respects, 
the actual decision of the court. 30A Am. J ur. 589, 
Judgments Sec. 606. 
The Burton and Cox Decree proceedings are a monu-
ment to judicial maladministration. There are overlap-
ping files (one file, Exhibit 2, purports to cover from 
1919 to 1935; another, Exhibit 5, claims to cover the 
year 1924:; a third, Exhibit 3, claims to cover 1930 to 
193± while a fourth, Exhibit 6, is marked "1930 to 1932" 
and the last one (Exhibit 4) artlessly states it holds 
"papers with no filing date shown.") There is no conti-
nuity either within or among the various files. There are 
~everal versions of the "Cox" Decree appearing in the 
files (See Exhibit 2 last documents, Exhibit 4, Page 59, 
and Exhibit 6 Pages 1 to 17), all different. There can-
not be found anywhere even one version of what is ac-
Ct>pted by repute as the "Burton" Decree. 
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To say, m; Glendale's witnPss Anderson state;-;, that 
the East Fork users were shunnPd (Tr. llG) is a gro88 
understatement. 
\\Thile the Appellants lay great store in Plaintiffs' 
omission to get the "error" of misapplied priority dates 
corrected within the five y(•ar period of retained juris-
diction, they cannot point to anything in the file whif'lt 
shows Plaintiffs knew or had any obligation to know 
there ever occurred such an error or omission. 
Section 37 Ch. 67 Laws of 1919 provided that 
within 30 days after entry of a judgment: 
* * * it shall be the duty of the clerk of thl' 
district court to issue to each person awarded the 
use of water by such judgment a certificate in 
triplicate attested under the seal of the court, 
setting forth the determination of his water right 
as specified, in Section 33 [which required a com-
plete definition of the right, including prioritie~. 
if any]. Three copies of said certficate shall be 
transmitted in person or by registered mail, to 
such party * * * 
Not only is there an absence of proof of entry of 
the judgment or decree of the Court in 1925 (or at any 
time thereafter) 1 there is also absence of proof that this 
statute was complied with. 
The State Engineer carried the burden of moving 
this adjudication along as appears by the entire files 
and his Proposed Determination was the nucleus and sub-
1Although we do not necessarily take the position that there was 
none. 
24 
stancE~ of the proceeding, as well as the vehicle on which 
it traveled. (See Appendix vii, viii, and ix, and the Bur-
ton and Cox Decrees). However, reference to this Pro-
posed Determination in all the court's orders and docu-
mentation is uniformly qualified with the words "as 
amended," "as corrected to conform to the stipulations" 
or ''as amended by the order of the court." 
This portfolio of proposed rights carried around by 
thP State Engineer became a "fact of independent legal 
significance" which the court approved from time to 
timP, assuming that the State Engineer was correcting, 
updating, and servicing the same as the parties compro-
mised, settled or stipulated to resolve their differences. 
The Court thus delegated to the State Engineer 
the ministerial responsibility to see that the stipulations 
of the parties emerged with the final determinaton. An 
act or omission to perform this delegated responsibility, 
being ministerial and nonjudicial, may be corrected at 
any time. The State Engineer's oversight being correct-
ible now, the Burton and Cox Decrees must, under the 
rules that equity regards as done that which should 
have been done and respects substance rather than form, 
lie interpreted to supply the oversight if serious prejudice 
and irreparable injury is not to be imposed upon the 
Plaintiffs. 
Equity regards and treats that as done which in 
good conscience ought to be done (Pomeroy Eq. Jur. 
Src. 36-1) and a court of equity will ratify that which 
was done without its authority, when upon application 
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it would have ordered it to be done, if there is no other 
method of doing justice. Johnson vs. Long (Maryland 
1938) 199 Atl. 459, 116 A.L.R. 617. 
POIN'l1 I 
THE COURT \VAS CORRECT IN DENYING DE-
FENDANTS' MOTION FOR A SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT AND IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT UPON THE ISSUE 
OF PRIORITIES SOLELY. 
A. * * * 
B. The historical and present uses on the stream, 
the contemporaneous construction of the Bur-
ton and Cox Decrees by the parties, and the 
stipulation resolving the issue of priorities 
collectively or in the disjunctive preclude De-
fendants from changing the uses, practices 
or administration of the East Fork. 
An interesting theory of the Defendants is that 
the Plaintiffs should have been barred to assert their 
claims by reason of the doctrine of "laches" lying in 
Plaintiffs' omission to correct the Burton Decree within 
the five-year period of the court's retention of jurisdic-
tion. 
First, as we have pointed out to the court before, 
there was not only not brought home to the Plaintiffs 
the existence of such an error in the Burton Decree, 
there was no Burton Decree available in the file, let 
alone served upon any of the claimants. 
\Ve respectfully call attention to page 12 of thr 
Appellants' brief in which they state: 
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Based upon such water users' claims, and 
after a consideration of objections and protests 
and hearings thereon, and it must be assumed, 
upon competent evidence, the Court on December 
12, 1925, made and entered a decree (printed 
decree entered by Thos. H. Burton, Judge, dated 
Dec. 12, 1925, on file in office of State Engineer). 
The parenthesized expression in that statement is 
very curious and very necessary: there is no original 
Burton Decree in the files. 
However, Mr. Anderson as representative of Plain-
tiff Mt. Carmel and Defendant Glendale Irrigation Com-
panies knew of the decree, and he knew of the priorities 
(Tr. 118). Still he reported to the Glendale Board of 
Directors that their rights under the McCarty Decree 
"had been protected.n (Tr. 89) 
Defendants now say that the delict of Plaintiffs in 
not correcting an "error" that they were advised could 
never have occurred prevents them from correcting the 
error now, but allows Defendants to begin, 35 years later, 
changing the practices on the stream to conform to this 
''error." 
Glendale continually asserts that the other users 
were required, to avoid the penalty of "laches," to cor-
rect this error within the so-called five-year retention 
of jurisdiction period. The complete answer to this 
l'laim is the rhetorical question: Why? 
Why should they (the Plaintiffs) have at-
tempted to modify a consent decree which they 
had every reason to believe had been entered 
according to the terms of their consent? 
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"\Vhy should they have attempted to modify a 
decree under ·which the rights they historic~J]y 
had enjoyed did not change? · 
"\Vhy should they have attempted to modify a 
decree that could not have been found in the' 
court files 11 
Why should they have attempted to modify a 
decree that gave them, with only imperceptibl~ 
differences by farmers' standards of measuring 
water, the same quantities of water as they had 
historically enjoyed?~ 
"\Vhy ·would they have attempted to modify a decrer 
under which they were being distributed the same pro-
portionate quantities of water as they had always re-
ceived (See Appendix page x) and were being assessed 
according to a classification disciplined after their stipu-
lation (See Appendix ii and iii and the full document 
abstracted at Appendix viii and ix) ·which assessment was 
the only contact they had with the State Engineer in 
administration of the stream. 
The Plaintiffs had no duty and were chargeable with 
no notice making it prudent for them to presume to 
change a decree which was serving them just as the 
l\IcCarty Decree had historically done. 
1 This is one situation where even the industrious brief writer would 
be tempted to employ as a fact reference the phrase of th": incor· 
rigible indolent: "see the record"; however, the best runmng kacd 
count of the Burton proceedings seems to be the file mar e 
"1919-1935" which contains indices for each year. No referenc~ 
is made anywhere to a Burton Decree or any other documen 
purporting to be a final determination except for the "Cox" Decree 
which calls itself (in all three versions) the "Supplemental and 
Final Decree." 
2 See Appendix page x. 
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The witness Anderson, after representing parties at 
the Burton proceedings (Tr. 11±, 115 ), returned and re-
ported to Marcellus Johnson that "the McCarty Decree 
would not be molested" (Tr. 89). Had he reported any-
foing different to Glendale's Board we may rest assured 
it would have been corrected: because (1) Glendale would 
have attempted to utilize the higher priority and the 
other users would have pressed for a change in the 
Decree or (2) and the more likely, the honorable men 
who were in control of Glendale Irrigation Company's 
affairs at the time would have insisted that the Decree 
he modified. 
Instead, Glendale waited until the five years passed 
away and control passed from the hands of these re-
spected men who observed their word (and their sig-
natures) and want to assert this right after sleeping on 
it for 35 years. (See 30 C.J.S. 499; Equity Sec. 100). 
Glendale received a consideration for the 1924 stip-
ulation: they did not have to prove that the company 
had fully appropriated all of its rights prior to 1870. 
An irrigation company is only a composite of the rights 
which are conveyed to it by its charter stockholders in 
Pxchange for shares. These constituent rights are as 
varied as are the individuals who onwed them and the 
lands upon which they were first appropriated. In-
rluded with the rights transferred to the corporation for 
shares would necessarily have been some inferior to 
many other rights, some which undoubtedly were sub-
ordinated to the entire Glendale system. 
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The recently decided case of Walker heirs vs. Walker 
(July 19, 1965 Case No. 10286) disposes of a situation 
where, as here, each party claims the other guilty of 
laches. Justice Crockett, writing for the unanimous 
Court, said : 
The answer to sueh a stalemate seems to be 
that the burden of taking some affirmative action 
should be upon him who accuses the other of de-
lay; and unless he has taken such action, or in 
some manner put the other party on notice that 
action is required, he cannot take advantage of the 
delay. 
In the Walker case the defendant claimed that sinC'e 
he took deeds to the property 40 years before commence-
ment of the action, 1 failure of the plaintiffs to attack 
his ownership barred them for sleeping on their rights. 
This Court held with logic that considerations entitling 
the plantiffs to assume that they had not been divestrd 
of their rights 2 together with the fact that some members 
of the family remained in the property3 "make the refusal 
of the trial court to apply laches against the plaintiffs 
harmonize ·with reason." 
We respectfully submit that the parallel elements 
and ratio dccidendi of the vValker case make it controlling 
here. 
1Completely analagous to the position of the Defendant here, Glen· 
dale Irrigation Company, who claims to have taken "title" to the 
priority by the Burton or Cox Decree, or both, 35 years ago. 
2Which Plaintiffs in this action also had the right to assume becausd 
of the "Objection" (Appendix ii, iii) by which Glendale surrendere 
any claim it had to a priority. 
BCorresponding to the Plaintiffs in this action continuing during all 
these years to enjoy the right of equal priority dates and the pro· 
rating of losses without deprivation of any water by the State 
Engineer or Glendale Irrigation Company. 
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It is controlling for the reason that the Defendants 
here have utterly and categorically based, as they can 
only base, their entire case 2nd claim upon the defense 
of ]aches. They have neither equity, fairness, historical 
entitlem~nt, nor use or possession on their side. If they 
cannot prevail because Plaintiffs should have done some-
thing Plaintiffs failed to do they cannot prevail at all. 
POINT I 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING DE-
FENDANTS' MOTION FOR A SUMMARY JUDG-
J\TENT AND IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT UPON THE ISSUE 
0.F' PRIORITIES SOLELY. 
A. * * * 
B. * * * 
C. To the extent that either the Burton or the 
Cox Decree, or both, purports to subordinate 
Plaintiffs' priorities to those of the Defendant 
Glendale Irrigation Company, the adjudication 
is void. 
In Eden Irrigation vs. District Court of Weber 
County, 61 Utah 103, 211 P. 957, the general adjudication 
statute was attacked as an unconstitutional delegation 
of authority to the State Engineer by authorizing him 
to determine and adjudicate water rights that previously 
had been adjudicated and fixed by a Court. In disposing 
of that assertion this Court said: 
A complete answer to this contention is found 
in the act itself. The italicized portion of Section 
32 expressly provides that where the rights to 
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the use of water from a stream or body of watt•r 
have been adjudicated 'said water sh~ll be di8-
tributed in accordance with such decree until the 
same be reversed, modified, vacated, or otlwnrise 
legally set aside.' 
* * * 
No one is required to again litigate or deft>nd 
rights which have been fixed by a decree of eomt, 
so long as he merely uses ·water in accor<lame 
with the terms of such decree and the qnantit)' 
of ~'ater awarded him thereby. 
The McCarty Decree has established all rights as 
among the corporations or users ·who were brought with-
in "Class 1" of the Burton and Cox Decrees. It was 
the obligation of the District Court of 'N ashington 
County to leave them alone until that Decree was "re-
versed, modified, vacated, or otherwise legally set aside." 
It cannot be disputed that the Court had nothing 
before it which could deprive the Plaintiffs in this action 
of the valuable vested interest of equal priorities. With-
out the appearance of the parties by the stipulation 
(Appendix ii, iii) it had nothing before it to confer 
jmisdiction to adjudicate any rights. Action of a court 
is void if it finds an essential jurisdictional fact witl10ut 
any proof. 30A AM. Jur. 17+, Jitdgmcnts, Sec. 22. 'rhe 
Court had pmver to incorporate the McCarty Decree into 
the Burton-Cox determinations but had no authority, 
without consent or proof, to invade the East Fork right:; 
inter sc. 
The Comt had authority by virtue of the East 
Fork users' stipulation to emliody the Tights then' 
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agrePd upon into its Decree. The la'.v is well settled 
that a court may not render a judgment which transcends 
tlw limits of its authority and the excess exercise of its 
jurisdiction is void if beyond the powers granted to 
the Court even where it has jurisdiction over the parties 
and the subject matter. United States vs. W alkcr, 109 
r.s. 208, 27 L. Ed. 927, 3 S.Ct. 277. 
POINT IL 
THI<J COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN REFUSING 
'1'0 DISQUALIFY HIMSELF. 
A. The Affidavit of Defendants was insufficient 
as a matter of law. 
B. The Affidavit of Defendants was not timely. 
C. Defendants cannot be prejudiced because of 
the availability of complete direct review of 
both the facts and the law. 
A. An affidavit under Rule 63(a) being unassailable 
hy countering proof, must have met the requirements 
of the rule strictly. The affidavit of Charles Anderson 
did not establish either bias or prejudice. The Court 
had held two hearings, including a lengthy argument 
on concurrent .l\fotions for Summary Judgment, had 
received briefs, and reviewed all the exhibits. 
There is no record of this fact, but counsel will not 
deny that the Court, at the conclusion of the hearing 
on the last motions, asked to meet with the parties, 
and this was approved by all counsel. He may have said 
he believed the Plaintiffs should prevail, but this is not 
kno\rn. He could have said so upon the record, and that 
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certainly should not have disqualified him after the 
case, so far as counsel were concerned, had been fully 
submitted; both believing there was no issue of law 
or fact undetermined. Even had he expressed an opinioll 
it would not have established bias or prejudice under 
any state of the record ( 48 C.J.S. p. 1076 Judges, Sec. 
89, See note '79) and certainly not at that point. 
'l'he term "sympathy" as pointed out by Judge C. 
Nelson Day who heard the affidavit on its sufficiency, 
does not imply a correlative bias or prejudice. 
Attempts to have the parties settle does not diR-
qualify a judge. 48 C.J.S. p. 1078, Judges, Sec. 89. 
POINT II. 
THI~ 1COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN REFUSING 
TO DISQUALIFY HIMSELF. 
A. * * * 
B. The Affidavit of Defendants was not timely. 
The motion to disqualify the judge came at the 
time indicated just hereinabove, and should have been 
summarily denied for that reason. Lepasiotes v. Dins-
dale 121 U. 359, 242 P. 2d 297. 
C. Defendants cannot be prejudiced because of 
the availability of complete direct review of 
both the facts and the law. 
In an equity case the Supreme Court will review 
questions of both law and fact. Tripp vs. Bagley 7-± Utah 
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57, 276 P. 912, 69 ALR 1417. Whether the Trial Court 
was biased (which we submit was certainly not the case) 
or not becomes immaterial upon this appeal. The Trial 
Court took no evidence but only reviewed the record as 
it appeared from the pleadings, interrogatories, depo-
sistion and exhibits. If it erred (whether as a result 
of bias, prejudice, misapplication of the facts or mis-
interpretation of the law) all this Honorable Court need 
do is reverse the decision. 
POINT III. 
THE INTERROGATORIES AND THEIR ANSWERS, 
THE DEPOSITIONS, AND THE ENTIRE FILE AND 
PLEADINGS ARE SUFFICIENT UPON WHICH TO 
BASE THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The Appellants' brief argues in three sub-headings 
under Point IV that the records and files made are not 
sufficient upon which to base a summary judgment not-
withstanding that the first motion for summary judgment 
was filed by them. 
Issue must be taken with their beginning statement 
that "even a casual reading of the depositions of the three 
witnesses do not show any positiveness upon the part of 
any one of them concerning how the water was admin-
istered from 1931 to 1961." 
Charles Anderson, the deponent in the affidavit of 
bias and prejudice and in the third deposition, said when 
asked if the distribution practices changed when the 
Burton Decree was adopted: 
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A. No, they didn't. The company kind of went 
on a share and share alike basis, as Brother 
1 ohnson, Marcellus, told you, for a while. 
Q. Hmv long did that last'? 
A. Oh, it lasted up until the time the Glendale 
Irrigation Company asked the State EnginPer 
to grant them whatever rights they havt. 
Q. And that \rnuld have been in 19GO or 1%1, 
is that right? 
A. ·whenever that was. 
(Tr. 118, lines 7-lG) 
All the witnesses they planned to call at the trial 
(Tr. 51) having knowledge of distribution practices 
agreed with the J olmson and Anderson statements. 
The State Engineer does not have any record of 
water distributions or measurements except for the years 
19Gl and 196:2. (Tr. 57, para. 2) 
Now here in the pleadings, the record, or the Appel-
lants' brief do we find anyone daring to say that Glendale 
has exercised their claimed priority. 
The pleadings, admissions and depositions (\\·here 
appropriate) must all be considered by the court in 
making its determination upon a motion for smmuar.r 
judgment. L1111ducrg i:. Backntw1 9 U. 2d 58, 337 P. ~d 
433. 
The transcendent feature of the record, however, are 
the Interrogatories. 
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When Glendale Irrigation Company was asked in the 
(nterrogatories (Tr. 55) if it used its claimed priority, 
an cl if so, how they planned to prove it, they answered: 
'l'his interrogatory is not subject to any pre-
cise answer, and particularly at this time. 
(Tr. 58) 
All the supplemental interrogatories (Tr. 54:, 55) 
sought to reach the facts about \\rhich Defendant Glen-
dale Irrigation Company had been so highly evasive 
in its prior response. (Tr. 50, 51) The answers to the 
8upplemental interrogatories were in the form of nega-
tive proof (Tr. 57). They have no evidence other than 
their own witnesses' sworn testimony that they have not 
used this priority at any time within the past 35 years. 
'l'he Interrogatories are a sharp sword when it comes 
to defining what are and what are not the genuine issues 
in a suit, cleaving the real from the apparent or the 
suspect. In the 1965 Pocket Supplement to Volume 3, 
Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, at 
page 7G, Section 1236, it is stated with respect to Answers 
to Intenogatories and their relation to Summary Judg-
llll'n t : 
"' * * There are important differences between 
affidavits and answers to interrogatories * * * 
An affidavit is the weakest form of evidence and 
is not ordinarily admissible at trial. Its function 
on a motion for summary judgment is to show that 
there is available competent testimony which can 
be introduced at the trial. The answer to an 
interrogatory, however, is admissible at the trial 
when offered by the op1Josing party, since it is 
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an admission of an adverse party. An important 
purpose of the interrogatories rule is to limit the 
parties in their later contentions, and it is im-
material that the party has made the admission, 
and thus limited themself, without personal know-
ledge of the facts. Thus all answers to interroga-
tories should be considered on a motion for sum-
mary judgment when they are put forward by 
the party who served the interrogatories. · 
The Defendants' belief that, provided they could 
secure a reversal for trial upon the issue of uses, evi-
dence would come forth that Glendale had exercised 
its priority is the expression of a faith similar to that 
defined by Paul in his letter to the Hebrews as 
The substance of things hoped for, the evidence of 
things not seen. (Hebrews 11 :1) 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DIRECTED THE 
STATE ENGINEER TO DISREGARD PRIORITY 
DATES PURPOR':eEDLY ADOPTED BY THE BUR-
TON-COX DECREES IN DEROGATION OF THE 
EQUAL PRIORITY DATES ESTABLISHED BY 
THE MC CARTY DECREE. 
It is clear that the "Class 1" rights emerging from 
the "Cox" Decree are the exact counterparts of the 
rights mrnrded by the ''J\foCarty" Decree (Appendix page 
x). 
All the trial court did was to treat those users 
with the classification of "Class 1" as having equal 
priority dates (Tr. 162, 163). 
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'l'he only thing required of the State Engineer re-
specting the judgment of the trial court is that those 
"Class 1" users pro-rate losses when the flow of Long 
Valley Creek falls below the total volume of water neces-
sary to fill all of those rights designated within "Class l." 
As we have tried to demonstrate in this brief, this 
has been the practice since 1900. 
We take exception to the statement found on pages 
~O and ±1 of Appellants' brief purporting to be a quote 
from the "Burton" Decree. Appellants cite no reference 
to the record for this quotation. None can be found and 
no one has ever been charged with actual or constructive 
notice of that language being employed by any court at 
any time affecting the watt>rs here in question. 
There is an annotation in Volume 120 American 
Law Reports beginning at page 868 in which the editor 
makes the pertinent statement that: 
The cases declare that the rule of practical 
construction applies to ambiguous judgments, and 
that such a construction adopted by the interested 
parties, especially if acquiesced in for a long time, 
will not be departed from by the court "except 
for strong reasons.'' The observation may be 
made, however, that the rule has commonly been 
laid down in support of that construction which 
the court regarded as correct. And elements of 
estoppel sometimes have been present. The rule 
seems to have peculiar force as applied to judg-
ments entered uy consent. 
(Emphasis Added) 
This statement and the cases supporting it seem 
dispositive of the issue before the Court. 
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A question may be ·whether or not the Burton Deem 
is ambiguous. First of all, there is great doubt cast upon 
what, if anything, it means when it is absent from tlw 
files. Second, it contains a provision for classes of 
rights Yd1ich classes are characterized solely by priority 
period. This classification has been preserved hy tlw 
trial court (Tr. 1G3). Third, the documents '-vhich an· 
in the file indicate that the Court has approved the 
East Fork "Objection" and incorporated it into the 
final determination. Fourth, the decree was entered un-
der jurisdiction of the court to proceed acquired by 
virtue of the stipulation of the parties, which stipulation 
dictated the terms the Defendants claim are nmr absent 
from the decree. 
CONCLUSION 
The only question to be resolved in this appeal is 
whether or not the trial court, on concurrent Motions 
for Summary Judgment, correctly ruled that Defendant 
Glendale Irrigation Company does not o-wn a priority 
which, if assertable, would entitle it to the entire flo1r 
of Long Valley Cr<:'ek until all its decreed rights are 
filled notwithstanding the following conditions which co-
<:'xist in militancy against such a preference: 
J. \Vhere Defendant Glendale Irrigation Company 
stipulated in the proceedings from which they claim this 
priority emerged that all rights on the system should 
be upon a basis of equal priorities. 
:2. \Vhere Defendant GlendalP Irrigation Company 
knowing, or being obligated to know, that the Plaintim 
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\1ere relying upon the written stipulation, allowed the 
fin'-year 1wriod for correction of clerical or other omis-
~ions or mistakes to expire, and then permitted another 
:JO years to elapse before asserting the priority. 
:3. Wncre there was no historic basis for the award 
of a higher priority. 
-±. Wlwre the stipulators for the parties before the 
court never did, and Glendale Irrigation Company did 
not until 35 years after the preference was purportedly 
granted, assert any right to exercise it. 
3. \Yh<>re, when all the men who were a party to 
the stipulation had since passed from control, supervision 
or direction of Glendale Irrigation Company did it for 
the first time attempt to assert such a preference. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
By Ken Chamberlain 
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PREPARED BY .. J.~ 
FROM llllAP FROWI 
UTAH STATE 
ENSINEE:RS OFFICE 
OECEhlll3iR 1962 
In the District Court of the Fifth Judicial 
District in and for ·w ashington County, State of Utah 
St. George and Washington 
Canal Company, a Corporation. 
vs. Objection 
Hurricane Canal Company, 
a Corporation, et al., I 
Comes now, Glendale Irrigation Company, a corporation, Order· I 
ville Irrigation Company a corporation, Mt. Carmel Irrigation Corn· I 
pany a corporation; defendants in this case, and objects to the 
proposed determination of water rights on the Virgin River System. I 
filed herein by the State Engineer, and shows the Court: i 
I. 
That on pages 5 to 7 inclusive of said determination, defendanti 
is determined to have rights to irrigate certain areas of land. 
II. 
That the acreage given in said determination is not the acreage 
that we have been used to irrigating heretofore. 
III. 
That we have been for years past operation under a decree 
issued in 1900 with W. M. McCarty as Judge. 
IV. 
That the waters under this decree have been used beneficialy, 
and satisfactory to all concerned. 
v. 
That said determination have set different dates of priority, 
which we desire shall all be under the same date, as was set forth 
in the aforesaid decree a copy of which is attached hereto, and an) 
acres irrigated other than is not called for in the McCarty decree. 
this acreage should take a date of priority of 1890. 
VI. 
That a share of water in the McCarty decree should and was 
made to mean the equivalent to an acre of lane!. 
Source: Exhibit 5 - File marked "1924" at page 133 - Burton De· 
cree proceedings Case No. 270, Washington County 
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and that each company or individual be given an acre of land for 
each share stated in the aforesaid Decree. 
VII. 
Wherefore defendant prays that said determination be changed 
and that defendants be decreed the right to irrigate and acre of 
land for each share of stock given in the McCarty Decree with a 
date of 1870. And any acreage which is not covered by McCarty 
Decree be given a date of 1890. That the distribution of water 
among the different irrigation companes above mentioned be divided 
according to the McCarty Decree. 
State of Utah 
SS 
County of .............................. . 
being first duly sworn deposes and says that they are the defendants 
mentioned in the foregoing objection, that they have read said ob-
jection and know the contents thereof to be true of their own knowl-
edge, and therefore says the contents thereof are true. 
/S/ 
/S/ 
/S/ Annie Macdonald 
Signed 
/S/ Fred G. Carroll 
Orderville -
/S/ David Esplin 
MtCarmel -
/S/ W. L. Hodges 
Glendale -
/S/ Marcellus Johnoson 
Whitney Macdonald 
/S/ J. C. Spencer 
Fred R. Major 
By Howard B. Spencer 
By W. Macdonald 
/S/ Llyle Chamberlain 
/S/ W. S. Carpenter 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15 day of December 1924. 
My commission expires 
Mar 12, 1926 
/s/ J. S. Levanger 
Notary Public 
On Page 137 of File marked 1919-1935 an exact counterpart of the 
foregoing "Objection" is entered showing the signatures of W. L. 
Hodges, President of the Board, and D. W. P. Stevens, a member 
of the Board, Mt. Carmel Irrigation Company. 
Source: Exhibit 5 - file marked "1924" at page 134 - Burton De-
cree proceedings. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH 
JUDICIAL DIS'l'RICT IN AND FOR 'L'HE 
COUNTY OF KANE, STATI<~ OF U'l'AH 
Mt. Carmel Irrig~tion Company, a co~po~ation, Orderville Irrigation Com. 
pany, a Corporation and Glendale Irrigation Company, a corporation 
Plaintiff's, ' 
vs. 
Joseph Hopkins, John Hyat, James Carpenter, James Smith, John Brim. 
hall, TJ:iomas Chamberlain, Willis Webb, John H. Stout, Leroy Harris, John 
T. Covmgton. H. 0. Spencer, H. K. Roundy, G. D. McDonald, John W 
Seaman, Q. F. Spencer, George Johnson and R. G. Jolley. 
Defendants. 
DECREE. 
This cause came on regularly for trial before the court, a jury trial having 
been expressly waived; E. E. Hoffman and John F. Brown appearing as 
attorneys for the plaintiffs and John F. Chidester appearing as attorney for 
the defendant Thomas Chamberlain and each of the plaintiffs as well as 
the following named defendants, to-wit: Joseph Hopkins, H. 0. SpenC€r, 
G. D. MacDonald, John W. Seaman, George Johnson, R. G. Jolley, Willis 
Webb, J. D. Carpenter, John Hyatt, John H. Stout, Thomas Chamberlain, 
James Smith, and 0. F. Spencer having heretofore signed and filed with 
the records and files herein stipulations in writing, admitting the rights 
and facts of the various parties to be as hereinafter set forth; and default 
having been taken against H. K. Roundy, John Brimhall, John T. Coving· 
ton and Leroy Harris, they having been regularly served in person with 
process and having failed to appear and answer the Plaintiff's complaint 
herein, and the legal time for answering having expired, and witnesses 
having been sworn who testified in open court as to the rights the various 
parties hereto, and the court being fully advised in the premises and _in 
accordance with the said stipulations and testimony made and filed 1~ 
Findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
IT IS TBEREFOR ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1st. That the defc·ndant Thomas Chamberlain, is the owner by prior appro-
priation, and by open, peaceable uninturrupted and adverse use of all of 
the waters of Chamberlains Lake. -
2nd. That the Defendants James Carpenter, John Hyat, and James Smith, 
ar~ the owners, by prior appropriation, and by open, peaceable, uninter· 
rupted and adverse use of all of the waters of Lydia's Fork, a tributary ol 
th2 East Fork of the Rio Virgin River, which if not diverted would flow 
into the said East Fork of the Rio Virgin River. 
3rd. That the plaintiffs and the following named defendants, to-wGit: 
Joseph Hopkins, Thomas Chamberlain, Willis Webb, H. 0. Spencer, R. · 
Jolley, R. K. Roundy, G. D. McDonald, John W. Seaman and George 
Johnson are the owners and entitlecl to the use of all of the normal flo1; 
of the East Fork of the Rio Virgin River, in Kane County, Utah, and 0 
its tributaries in the said county (except the aforesaid Chamberla~~ Laalike 
and the aforesaid Lydias Fork) in the following proportions, div1dmg .. 
of the water of said Lydias Fork) into 1,201-1/3 shares. Then the partie> 
in this paragraph mentioned are entitled to and are the owners of the 
following proportions, to-wit: 
Mt. Carmel Irrigation Company 404 & 5/6 shares of said 1201-1/3 shares 
Glendale Irrigation Company, 434 shares of said 1201-1/3 shares 
Ord:-rville Irrigation Company, 2651/z shares of said 1201-1/3 shares 
Joseph Hopkins 32 shares of said 1201-1/3 shares; 
Source: Exhibit 5, page 135 (Also Tr. 6) 
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Secom\ Page of Decree. 
Thomas Chamberlain. in addition to the waters of the Chamberlain Lake of 
which he is the owner as hereinbefore mentioned, is the owner of 11 shares 
of said 1201-1/3 shares: 
Willis Webb, 10 shares of said 1201-1/3; 
H. O. Spencer, 5 shares of said 1201-1/3 shares; 
H. K. Roundy, 9 shares of said 1201-1/3 shares; 
G. D. McDonald, 9 shares of said 1201-1/3 shares; 
.lohn W. Seaman, 9 shares of said 1201-1/3 shares; 
George Johnson, 4 shares of the said 1201-1/3 shares; 
R. G. Jolley, 7 shares of the 1201-1/3 shares; 
That each of the parties to this suit, their agents, servants and employees 
be and they and each of them, their agents, servants and employees are 
hereby perpetually enjoined and restrained from in any way mnaner or 
at all, interfearing with the use of the water which is hereby decreed to 
belong to th;;-other parties to this suit, or to either or any of them and 
are likewise restrained from in any manner or at all, interfearing with the 
full free and uninterrupted enjoyment and use of said wat;'rs as herein-
before decreed. 
4th. That said water (except the waters of Chamberlain Lake and Lydias 
Fork) shall be divided and distributed to the parties entitled thereto, by 
a water commissioner, to be appointed by the court; that the parties 
herdo, who are the owners of a portion of the water which he shall divide, 
shall pay said water commissioner a reasonable compensation for his services. 
That the prorata of said water commissioner's compensation against each 
person after the same becomes due, shall have the effect of a judgment 
against each person. 
5th. That each party hereto pay his own costs except the costs of court 
which shall be apportioned bewteen the several parties hereto according 
to the proportion of water herein decreed to them, that the costs of the 
clerk of the court are hereby taxed at $10.50. 
Dated April 18th, 1900. 
Source: Exhibit 5, page 136 (Also Tr. 7) 
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W. M. McCarty 
Judge 
